A key tool for studying the demand for neighborhood amenities and estimating the benefits from amenity improvements is a regression of house value on amenity levels, controlling for housing characteristics. Several scholars have developed methods to address the methodological challenges, such as endogeneity, faced by these "hedonic" regressions.
I. Introduction
Because housing prices reflect households' bids for housing in different locations, a regression of house value or rent on housing and neighborhood characteristics, also called a hedonic regression, is a key tool in the study of household demand for the quality of public schools, clean air, neighborhood safety, access to worksites, and neighborhood ethnic composition, among other things. Moreover, when direct measures of demand are not available, hedonic regressions are a valuable tool for estimating the benefits from public programs that alter these neighborhood traits (Graves 2012) . In recent years, many scholars have developed new
techniques to solve problems, such as endogeneity, that arise in estimating hedonic regressions.
Unfortunately, however, many applications of these techniques have lost track of the basic principles of hedonic estimation in Rosen (1974) and its extensions; thus, they often provide misleading estimates of household willingness to pay for neighborhood improvements. After providing background on the Rosen framework and the subsequent literature, this article illustrates the hedonic "vices" that have become far too common in recent hedonic studies and shows how to fix them.
More specifically, Section II reviews the Rosen framework, with a focus on the relationship between attribute bid functions and their hedonic envelope. Section III turns to three types of vices: the use of extreme or incorrect functional forms, the use of inappropriate control variables, and the misinterpretation of hedonic regression results. Our analysis is supported with estimates using data from the Cleveland area in 2000. Section IV presents our conclusions and reviews how these vices can be averted.
II. Background

A. The Rosen Framework
Most studies in this literature, including this one, follow the framework in the seminal article by Rosen (1974) , which explores the pricing of multi-attribute products in a competitive market. Rosen distinguishes between a household bid function for a product attribute and the market price function, also known as the hedonic. In our terms (which differ from Rosen's), P is a bid and S is an amenity. A bid function is an iso-utility curve for P and S for a given type of household, and the hedonic, labeled P E , is the envelope of bid functions across households. The allocation of households across values of S is known as "sorting." Figure 1 , which is analogous to Figure 2 in Rosen, provides an example of this bidding-sorting framework.
When applied to housing, Rosen's framework highlights the fact that housing prices reflect both the underlying demands for amenities, bidding, and the allocation of households across neighborhoods with different levels of the amenity, sorting. Rosen proposes a two-step empirical approach that makes it possible to separate these two factors. The first step is to estimate a hedonic regression, P E as a function of S, and then to differentiate the results to find the implicit or hedonic price, / E E S P S P ∂ ∂ ≡ , at each value of S. Because each bid function is tangent to the envelope, the derivative of the envelope at the value of S a household receives equals the implicit price it faces. Thus the second step is to estimate the demand for S, that is, to regress S on E S P and other demand factors. An equivalent procedure is to estimate the inverse demand function, that is, to regress E S P on S (and other demand factors).
As is well known, the main problem facing this procedure is that the implicit price is endogenous in the second-step regression (or, equivalently, S is endogenous in the second-step inverse demand regression). See Taylor (2008) . If the hedonic function is nonlinear, households "select" an implicit price when they select a level of S. And if the hedonic is linear, it yields no variation in implicit prices with which to estimate demand. Households have different preferences, so the level of S, and hence the implicit price they select depends on their observed and unobserved traits. Hence, regressions of S on the implicit price (or vice versa) are subject to endogeneity bias. Another challenge facing this procedure is bias in the first-step regression due to omitted neighborhood variables. As we will see, attempts to address these challenges sometimes introduce endogeneity into (or change the meaning of) the first-step regression.
The literature on local public finance (reviewed in Ross and Yinger 1999 ) complements the Rosen framework in the case of public services and neighborhood amenities (both designated by S). This literature emphasizes the importance of household sorting across communities (or neighborhoods) with different S. Figure 1 illustrates the most fundamental sorting theorem, namely, that households with higher demand for S and hence with steeper bid functions sort into locations with higher S. Sorting plays a critical role in our federal system, and this sorting theorem has been explored by several scholars, notably Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2001) . In this context, a "steeper bid function" is one that is steeper at a given value of S, which we call "relative" steepness. This relative steepness is not the same as Rosen's implicit price, which is the steepness of the envelope at the level of S a household consumes, because this implicit price is affected by S. The slope of a bid-function is a household type's marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) or demand curve for the amenity. As shown in Figure 1 , the high level of S consumed by high-demand households may push them so far down their demand curve that the implicit price they face is below the implicit price faced by low-demand households-despite the higher relative slope that goes with high demand. 1 Rosen (1974) recognized that his framework was "similar in spirit to Tiebout's (1956) 1 Most studies also use the single-crossing condition, which rules out extreme preferences.
analysis of the implicit market for neighborhoods, local public goods being the 'characteristics' in this case " (p. 40) . Nevertheless, the literature on local public finance has shifted the framework used by most studies of this topic in two ways. First, it assumes that people care about housing services, which are a function of the structural characteristics of housing, and public services. This approach, which generally assumes that the implicit prices of structural characteristics are constant and do not lead to sorting, alters the algebra of a hedonic equation but does not alter the basic principles. Second, this approach provides a way to simplify the supply side. Rosen's framework applies to good with multiple traits. Heterogeneous firms each have an offer function for each trait, and the market price function is a joint envelope of the bid and offer functions. With restrictive assumptions, it is possible to derive a form for this joint envelope (as in Epple 1987 ). In the case of housing, however, housing suppliers do not supply neighborhood amenities and the focus has been on the demand side. We think this is entirely appropriate.
B. Rouwendal's Quadratic Envelope
An envelope is a mathematical concept, and further insight into the Rosen framework can be gained by showing the assumptions about bidding and sorting that are necessary to derive alternative forms for the hedonic envelope. The hedonic vices we identify below arise even without a formal treatment of bidding and sorting, but the use of this mathematical link helps clarify the sources of these vices and why they lead to faulty inferences about willingness to pay.
We start with a quadratic envelope derived by Rouwendal (1992) and then turn to an envelope based on constant elasticity demand functions, which was developed by Yinger (2013b) .
An envelope is the solution to two equations: A family of crossing curves, written in implicit form as f{P, S, Y}=0 (where P and S are variables and each member of the family has a different value of the parameter, Y) and fY{P, S, Y} = 0 (where fY is the derivative of f with respect to the parameter). In our case, f is a bid function: P is the housing bid (or its log), S is the amenity, and Y is income. As we will see, the fY equation describes the sorting equilibrium. Rouwendal's (1992) hedonic envelope assumes that a bid function takes the form:
where M indicates demand determinants (including income) and S indicates a public service or amenity. 3 Rouwendal then treats M as the parameter that varies across households. To find the envelope, therefore, Rouwendal differentiates (1) with respect to M to obtain
Setting this derivative equal to zero and solving for M yields 
2 The notation is not the same as Rouwendal's but the meaning is the same.
3 In this context, but not the rest of this paper, S could be a housing trait, too.
Three points are worth emphasizing. First, Rouwendal (1992) explains that equation (3) shows the value of M that maximizes the bid at a given value of S. This interpretation fits the intuition of sorting, which allocates housing at a given location (= given value of S) to the household with the demand factors (M) that lead to the highest bid for S at that location. Another way to make this point is that M determines the slope of a bid function at a given S; it is therefore the parameter that determines sorting. Thus, equation (3) describes the sorting equilibrium.
Second, the slope of the envelope reflects both the slope of the underlying bid functions and the slope of the sorting equilibrium. Bid functions generally get flatter as the amenity increases because of the law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution (MRS), but sorting implies steeper bid-function slopes as S increases. In the Rouwendal case, the bid functions (equation (1)) are linear in S, which corresponds to linear utility functions, that is, to a situation in which the MRS does not diminish as S increases. In this case, bidding has the same impact on the slope of the envelope at all values of S. It follows that the slope of the envelope has to increase as S increases because the sorting factor is the only one at work.
Third, the distinction between bid functions and the envelope is analogous to the distinction between short-run average cost curves, SRACs, and the long run-average cost curve, LRAC. A LRAC is the envelope of a set of SRACs. Each SRAC applies at a different value of the capital stock, and a set of SRACs is estimated with the capital stock as a variable-and with interactions between capital stock and output. 4 Any cost regression that includes capital stock must be interpreted as estimating SRACs, although it is only correctly specified for this purpose if it also includes interactions between capital stock and output. The same lesson applies to the hedonic envelope. If demand variables are included, the regression examines bid-functions, not a hedonic envelope, and a bid-function regression should include interactions between demand factors and amenities. Equation (1) has an interaction between M and S, for example. Moreover, a bid-function regression must treat the amenity variables as endogenous because unobserved demand traits affect both amenities and housing prices.
C. The Constant Elasticity Case
Yinger (2013b) provides a more general discussion of sorting and extends envelope derivations to the case of constant elasticity demand functions for amenities and housing. He starts by deriving a general form for a household bid function. He assumes, like most of the literature, that household utility depends on a composite good, Z, housing, H, and a public service or amenity, S. Households maximize their utility subject to the constraint that their income equals spending on Z, spending on housing, PH, and property taxes, which are levied at rate τ on house value, V = PH/r, where r is a discount rate. P=P{S, τ} is a housing bid that depends on S and τ. This well-known (Ross and Yinger, 1999) maximization problem leads to:
where the "^" denotes a before-tax bid and MBS is the MWTP for S. The role of property taxes is not important for our purposes and is therefore not considered. for nuclear power plants. A LRAC must be estimated without capital stock as a variable, which is the approach taken by Robidoux and Lester (1992) in their study of Canadian manufacturing.
Yinger then assumes that the demands for S and H take the following forms:
where W equals tax price, KS and KH are constants, and N and M are vectors of preferences and other demand variables, both observable and unobservable. LaFrance (1986) derives these forms from a model of "incomplete" demand, in which one set of commodities (Z) is not observed but affects the observed commodities (S and H) through a price index, which appears in N and M.
More specifically, LaFrance shows that these forms are consistent with the integrability requirements of a demand system. 5 This result is important here because it preserves the link between estimated price elasticities and household willingness to pay.
Substituting the inverse of (7), which equals MBS, and (8) into (6) and assuming that ν = -1, yields the following differential equation:
LaFrance's proof requires observed commodities to have the same income elasticity of demand (or else to have an income elasticity equal to zero or one) and cross-price elasticities equal to zero. Yinger (In Press, 2013b) shows that these requirements are not very restrictive.
The solution to this differential equation, i.e., the bid function, is
where C is a constant of integration. Note that the slope of a bid function at a given value of S depends on ψ; that is, ψ plays the same role in equation (11) that M did in equation (1).
Yinger's next step is to find the envelope of (11) using the sorting theorem. He reverses the mathematical steps in Rouwendal. Instead of arbitrarily specifying the constant and then differentiating the bid function to find ∂f{P,S,ψ}/∂ψ , Yinger draws on the sorting theorem to specify ∂f{P,S,ψ}/∂ψ, which describes the sorting equilibrium, and then integrates to find the constant. This approach opens the door to a more general derivation of hedonic envelopes and ensures a link between the form of the envelope and the assumptions about sorting.
More specifically, Yinger (2013a Yinger ( , 2013b explores the case of one-to-one matching in which each household type, identified by a value for ψ, sorts into a unique value for S. In this case, Yinger shows that the nature of the sorting equilibrium does not directly depend on the distributions of ψ and S; instead, it depends on the function that transforms the ψ distribution into the S distribution (or vice versa). Suppose, for example, that both ψ and S have normal distributions. Any normal distribution can be transformed into any other normal distribution with a linear transformation. In this example, therefore, the sorting equilibrium can be described by S as a linear function of ψ. To provide for a wider range of possible transformations between the ψ and S distributions, Yinger assumes that the sorting equilibrium can be described by
where the σs are parameters to be estimated. Assuming a linear form for this equilibrium, as in the above example, corresponds to assuming that σ3 = 1. The sorting theorem states that household types with steeper bid-function slopes sort into locations with higher values of S, so this theorem can be tested by determining whether σ2 is positive. Finally, note that equation (12) is analogous to Rouwendal's equation (3), except that (12) is based on theory.
One-to-one matching is unlikely to hold exactly. Some household types may live in locations with more than one value of S, for example, or some locations may be the home to more than one household type. Methods to consider these cases have been developed by Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2001) , but these methods are complex and restrict the analysis to a single amenity. 6 Moreover, Yinger (2013a) shows that one-to-one matching is likely to provide a close approximation to the case of one household type in more than one location. With many household types in a single location, however, no method can extract variation in willingness to pay for more than one amenity across household types, because one can observe only one housing price in that location.
Based on equations (11) and (12), Yinger (2013b) derives the bid-function envelope: function X (λ) is, of course, the Box-Cox form. An example of this envelope is provided in Figure   1 . With multiple amenities, the terms on the right side other than the constant term become summations across amenities, with different parameter values for each amenity. With ν = -1, the left side of (13) equals log{ˆE P } , and this form is easily incorporated into a standard log-linear regression with house-value, V, as the dependent variable and controls for structural housing traits, which determine housing services, H, and the property tax rate. See Yinger (2013b).
As shown in Table 1 , most parametric forms used for hedonic estimation (including linear, semi-log, log-linear, Box-Cox, and quadratic) are special cases of (13). Some forms implicitly assume, for example, that µ = -∞, which indicates a horizontal demand curve; a linear form also assumes that σ3 = ∞, whereas a quadratic form assumes a linear sorting equilibrium (σ3 = 1). A semi-log specification implicitly assumes that ν = -1 and μ = σ3 = ∞. Thus, most forms in the literature are based on stronger assumptions than those behind (13).
A key insight from (13) is that specifications consistent with sorting generally require two terms on the right side. The second term drops out only if σ3 = ∞, which, according to (12), implies that S is not a function of ψ, or, in other words, that sorting does not take place. 7 As the Rosen framework makes clear, the concept of sorting is essential for isolating willingness to pay with heterogeneous households, so one-term hedonics should be regarded with great skepticism.
D. Summary
In sum, the hedonic function is mathematically related to the bid-function envelopes. As 7 One-term specifications consistent with sorting require the extreme assumption that S is proportional to ψ; i.e., σ1 = 0. Taylor (2008) argues that a linear hedonic is appropriate when "the product can be costlessly repackaged" (p. 20), which does not apply to neighborhood amenities. (1 )/ 3 1
Note: Each formula in Panel B also has a constant term.
we will see, the hedonic vices discussed in this paper are all related to this mathematical connection. Some of the vices reflect extreme assumptions about the bid-functions or the envelope, others reflect an inconsistency between the forms assumed for these two functions, and still others arise because scholars confuse the bid-function and envelope concepts.
III. Hedonic Vices
A. Functional Form Vices and their procedure to estimate sorting makes use of a sorting-free instrument.
Contradictions between Steps
The Rosen two-step method calls for a general first-step regression combined with a specific second-step demand function. As shown by the Rouwendal (1992) and Yinger (2013b) derivations, assumptions about the form of the bid function combined with an assumption about the sorting equilibrium lead to a form for the envelope. Scholars who implement the Rosen twostep procedure should make an effort to ensure that they use consistent forms in the two steps.
Some approaches are clearly contradictory, at least with constant elasticity demands.
Forms for the hedonic that implicitly assume no sorting, such as linear or log-linear (Table 1, cases 2B and 3B), should not be used to estimate a second-step demand model, which is designed to shed light on sorting. Moreover, a quadratic hedonic assumes that bid functions are 9 In Bayer et al. a household i selects the house, h, that maximizes
U is indirect utility, X is housing traits and amenities, V is house value, and ε is a random error.
(This notation is ours, not theirs. See Bayer et al. 2007 , equation (2) ( )
linear, which corresponds to an infinite price elasticity of demand (Table 1, case 3A) , and therefore cannot be combined with a second-step demand that allows the elasticity to be finite.
Box-Cox forms do not resolve this issue. As shown in Table 1 (Case 4B), a single BoxCox form is not consistent with sorting. Moreover, two terms are necessary but not sufficient for consistency with sorting. The quadratic Box-Cox in Halvorsen and Pollakowski (1981) has two terms for each amenity with exponents λ and 2λ, which is consistent with equation (13) (or Table   1 , Case 4A) in special cases (e.g., μ = -∞ and σ3 = 1 for each amenity) but not in general.
Another approach is to use a nonparametric method to estimate the first step, and a parametric form to obtain a price-elasticity in the second step. Bajari and Kahn (2005) , for example, estimate the hedonic using local linear regression, and estimate the second-step demand function under the assumption that the price elasticity of demand for an amenity equals -1. With this assumption, both sides of the demand function can be multiplied by the implicit price, PS, to yield PSS on the left side and nothing endogenous on the right. This approach has the advantage that it addresses the endogeneity problem without requiring an instrument, but it makes the untestable implicit assumption that the associated hedonic can be estimated with local linear regression. Because the demand function is restricted, this assumption seems unlikely to hold.
Overall, simple specifications for the hedonic are not generally consistent with household heterogeneity and sorting, except under extreme assumptions. Scholars should identify new assumptions under which the simple form they use is compatible with sorting or replace this form with one of the sorting-consistent forms in but it runs into two difficult problems in practice. First, the impact of demand variables on amenity bids must be specified through interaction terms, such as the last term in equation (1).
Without interactions, the impact of an amenity on housing bids is the same for all households, which rules out heterogeneity and sorting based on observable demand traits.
Second, bid functions are subject to the fundamental endogeneity problem discussed earlier. In standard applications, this endogeneity problem does not arise when estimating the hedonic, but it does arise in Rosen's second-step because unobserved demand factors influence both the implicit price of an amenity and the level of the amenity. When bid functions are estimated, unobserved demand variables are correlated with both the amenity variables included in the regression and housing bids. A related endogeneity problem may arise from a correlation between observed and unobserved demand variables. Rosen (1974) makes it clear that demand variables appear in bid function but do not belong in the envelope. Several scholars (in addition to Rouwendal 1992 and Yinger 2013b) have emphasized this difference. For example, Butler (1982, p. 96) concludes that "augmenting the list of independent variables with such demander characteristics as income-a fairly common practice-is a clear misspecification." In our terms, adding demand characteristics changes the interpretation of the regression, whereas leaving out interactions rules out sorting.
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This discussion focuses on household-level demand variables. In practice, however, most studies do not include household-level information but do observe demand variables at the neighborhood level. Because of sorting, neighborhood-level demand variables may cause the same problems. Sorting implies that neighborhood income and household type may be highly correlated with the individual income and the other household traits that influence housing bids.
As a result, estimating a house-value regression with neighborhood traits and neighborhood-level demand variables on the right side examines bid functions, not their envelope-the hedonic.
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This point was made by Butler (1982, p. 96n) , whose review of empirical work says that "[I]n most of these studies, income and other demander characteristics are intended as proxies for neighborhood quality. However, since the data used were aggregated to the 'neighborhood' level, it is impossible to separate the function of, for example, income as a neighborhood quality 11 Taylor (2008, p. 344 ) also emphasizes that "[C]haracteristics of the consumers and sellers of the product do not belong in the hedonic price regression" (emphasis in the original).
proxy from its role as a characteristic of demanders in that neighborhood." 13 Moreover, Yinger (2013b) points out that, because of sorting, neighborhood income might be a better measure of a household's permanent income, on which housing decisions are thought to be based, than the household's actual current income, which includes a transitory component.
Many hedonic studies that rely on the Rosen framework still include neighborhood-level demand variables such as income and education as "controls" (Bayer et al. 2007; Black 1999; Brasington and Hite 2008; Chay and Greenstone 2005; Kane et al. 2006; and Palmquist 1984) .
Thus, these studies estimate bid functions instead of hedonic envelopes. Not a single one of these studies includes interaction terms between demand variables and amenities. 14 As a result, these studies all estimate mis-specified bid-functions that rule out the possibility of sorting.
Several scholars have made arguments in favor of including demand variables in a hedonic regression. Some of these arguments are helpful but, as we will see, they ultimately fail to address the main issue. Chay and Greenstone (2005, p. 392) argue, for example, that
Income and other similar variables are generally excluded on the grounds that they are "demand shifters" and are needed to obtain consistent estimates of the MWTP function. However, if individuals believe that there are spillovers, then the presence of wealthy individuals or high levels of economic activity is an amenity and the exclusion restriction is invalid. In our analysis, we are agnostic about which variables belong in the X vector.
A similar argument appears in Bayer et al. (2007) . Their regressions include "border fixed effects," or BFEs, which are discussed in Section III.C.3. Each BFE refers to a location that 13 Bayer et al. (2007) , Brasington and Hite (2008) , and Palmquist and Israngkura (1999) have household and neighborhood data. They argue that only neighborhood traits may be in the hedonic but do not rule out the correlation of traits across these two levels.
14 Chay and Greenstone (2005) and Brasington and Hite (2008) correct for the endogeneity of their amenity; Brasington and Hite also treat income as endogenous.
is within a certain distance of a segment of a school attendance-zone boundary. The neighborhoods on either side of a segment share traits that cannot be observed, but the impact of these traits on house values can be accounted for with BFEs. As Kane et al. (2006) Table 5 . The first 5 variables appear in quadratic form. An asterisk indicates significance of variable (or pair) at the 5 percent level in the regression in the second row of Table 5 . Some variables are in the original Brasington data set; others were added. The last dummy reflects unique voucher, charter school, or infrastructure programs in these two districts. See Yinger (2013b). Most of these variables were added to the Brasington data set using the CBG latitudes and longitudes in that data set. For details, see Yinger (2013b) and the technical appendix posted at http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/jyinger/. An asterisk indicates significance of a variable (or quartic in row 1) at the 5 percent level in the regression in the second row of Table 5 . The regression results are presented in Table 5 and summarized in Figures 2 and 3 . 18 In the parsimonious regression, the impact of high school quality is large (the first two columns of row 1 in Table 5 and Figure 2) . However, the results from the parsimonious regression are potentially biased from omitted amenities. Adding amenities as controls enhances the statistical significance of key variables. Using this correctly specified hedonic model, a house in a district with a 77 percent passing rate sells for about 34 percent more than one with a 13 percent passing rate. Adding the demand variables instead (row 3), has a much more dramatic effect, namely, to substantially lower the magnitude and significance of the school quality variable. If taken at face 18 These regressions and those in Yinger (2013b) are the second part of a two-part procedure.
First, ln{V} is regressed on housing characteristics, observed within-neighborhood differences, and neighborhood fixed effects using 23,000 house sales. Second, the coefficient of the fixed effect from the first part is regressed on neighborhood traits for 1,665 CBGs (=neighborhoods).
value, these estimates imply that a house in a district with a 77 percent passing rate sells for only 12.2 percent more than one with a low passing rate. As explained earlier, however, these estimates should be interpreted as a biased bid-function regression based on extreme sorting assumptions. Adding interactions with income (but, to keep the estimation manageable, not the other demand variables), leads to bid functions that vary with income (row 4, which gives results for at the median CBG income). Along this bid function, plotted in Figure 2 , the willingness to pay for housing increases 18.8 percent from the district with the lowest passing rate to the district with the highest passing rate; as discussed earlier, this estimate is subject to endogeneity bias. As shown by the second two columns of Table 5 and by Figure 3 , the results for neighborhood ethnicity also depend heavily on specification. The parsimonious regression (row 1 of Table 5 and Figure 3) indicates that house values drop 24.6 percent as one moves from zero percent black to 74 percent black, but also drop 3.6 percent as one moves from 100 to 74 percent black. Because largely black neighborhoods tend to have poorer amenities, the impact of ethnicity is smaller when controls for amenities are added. Based on the results in the second row of Table 5 , house values are 20.3 percent lower at 74 percent black than at 0 percent black and 2.6 percent lower at 74 than at 100 percent black. These highly significant results are consistent with the survey evidence, which indicates that some people are willing to pay more to live in a largely black neighborhood than in an integrated or white neighborhood (Yinger In Press) .
As in the case of the high school passing rate, adding income leads to an understatement of the amenity effect. The third row of Table 5 indicates that going from 0 to 63 percent black (the minimum has shifted) lowers house values by 17.7 percent, whereas going from 100 to 63 percent black lowers them by 6.7 percent (see Figure 4) . Adding interactions between income and both the school and ethnicity variables yields (possibly biased) bid function estimates. The bid function for the median homeowner income is tangent to the envelope in the second row at 10 percent black and declines continuously as percent black increases. Interpreting this estimate as an envelope is obviously a serious error.
Overall, these results are consistent with the view that bid functions, which include demand variables, have different shapes than the envelope. With demand variables (but no interactions) included, the regression is a biased, no-sorting bid-function regression, not a hedonic. More reasonable results can be obtained for a bid-function regression when the required interactions with income are added, but this regression still is subject to endogeneity bias. We know of no instruments to solve this problem.
Under certain assumptions, these results are also consistent with the hypothesis that homebuyers are able to determine income and other demand traits at the neighborhood level, consider these traits to be indicators of neighborhood quality, and adjust their housing bids (and hence the envelope) accordingly. These assumptions are that (a) neighborhood and household demand traits are uncorrelated and (b) neighborhood demand traits capture important dimensions of homebuyer's perceptions of neighborhood quality beyond the neighborhood amenities in Table 3 . We find both assumptions to be implausible: Sorting leads to relatively homogeneous neighborhoods, and the amenities in Table 3 cover a wide range of observable, statistically significant neighborhood traits. Scholars who include neighborhood-level demand variables in a hedonic regression should explain why they are willing to make these assumptions.
Neighborhood Fixed Effects
Many types of spatial fixed effects other than BFEs appear in the literature. See NguyenHoang and Yinger (2011) . These fixed effects can be distinguished by (1) their level of aggregation and (2) whether they are based on a single cross-section or panel data. Consider first cross-section fixed effects, which could apply to a census block group, a census tract, a zip code, a school district, or a county. These fixed effects are popular because they control for all unobserved variation in neighborhood amenities at or above the level of geography to which they apply. Fixed effects cannot be estimated at a given level of geography unless multiple house sales are observed at that level, so larger data sets lead to more chances for using this strategy.
The problem with geographic fixed effects in a cross section is that they control for all unobserved variables, including demand variables, at their specified level of aggregation. As a result, geographic fixed effects may introduce demand factors and hence change the meaning of the regression from an envelope to bid functions. This is not a problem for fixed effects at a high level of aggregation, such as a county, because a large share of the variation in demand factors occurs within counties. It is a problem, however, for fixed effects at a neighborhood level of aggregation, such as a census block group or tract, because, due to sorting, demand variables often do not vary greatly within a neighborhood. Introducing neighborhood level fixed effects therefore transforms a regression from a hedonic envelope into an analysis of bid functions.
Thus, the use of geographic fixed effects involves a trade-off that has not been recognized in the literature. Fixed effects at a smaller scale lead to better controls for unobserved non-demand factors, but it also leads to a higher correlation between the fixed effects and the demand factors that are not allowed in a hedonic regression. A regression with block group fixed effects, which are highly correlated with demand factors, is essentially equivalent to a bidfunction regression, for example, whereas a regression with census tract fixed effects, which are also correlated with demand factors but not to the same degree, is a hybrid estimation, somewhere between a bid function and an envelope. Fixed effects at higher levels of aggregation do not change the interpretation of the regression, but they also do not help to eliminate bias from omitted non-demand factors at lower levels of aggregation.
Some studies with panel data use repeat sales and include fixed effects for each house.
These fixed effects remove all time-invariant factors that might cause omitted variable bias. The resulting "within" estimator is based solely on variation over time in observed explanatory variables. So long as demand variables are not explicitly included, therefore, this type of regression can be interpreted as the change-form of a hedonic envelope. As discussed in Section III.C.2, these change regressions have serious problems of interpretation, but these problems do not arise from the link between fixed effects and demand factors.
Some studies use panel data not limited to double sales. In these studies, geographic fixed effects remove the over-time average impact of unobservable factors in each geographic unit.
The estimates are based on price deviations from these averages in each unit, with no controls (unless they are added separately) for deviations in demand variables from their over-time average. Regardless of the level of aggregation, therefore, the use of geographic fixed effects in a panel setting does not introduce demand factors into the analysis. Section III.C.3 shows, however, that their use does raise issues of interpretation.
Geographic fixed effects can be examined with the (cross-section) Cleveland data. The estimates in Table 5 are based on observations for 1665 CBGs spread out over 629 census tracts.
In the case of the high school variable, adding census tract fixed effects to the parsimonious specification results in an envelope with a negative (but statistically insignificant) slope. Turning to neighborhood ethnicity, the envelope with tract fixed effects starts and ends at the same place as the parsimonious specification in Figure 3 but is essentially linear. These results do not prove, of course, that these changes in the slopes of the bid functions associated with tract fixed effects reflect the impact of tract-level demand factors. Instead, these results could signify that the tract fixed effects eliminate bias caused by the omission of non-demand tract traits. Nevertheless, these results are consistent with the possibility that the inclusion of tract or other small-area fixed effects introduces inappropriate controls for demand variables. These controls may be measured with error, because they ignore within-tract variation in demand, and they may be accompanied by legitimate controls for non-demand factors, but neither of these possibilities can justify their use. If the coefficients of the tract effects reflect demand factors to a significant degree, a possibility that cannot be ruled out a priori or tested, then the regression is a hybrid somewhere between a hedonic envelope and a set of bid functions-not a true hedonic.
C. Interpretation Vices 1. Average MWTP Some simple two-term forms, such as a quadratic, are consistent with sorting. But even if the form is consistent, the estimated parameters provide limited information about household willingness to pay. As Rosen (1974) pointed out, each household sets its own MWTP equal to slope of the hedonic at the value of S it receives. As a result, the mean slope of the hedonic across observations is the mean MWTP for the sample. This point is stated clearly in several studies, such as Chay and Greenstone (2005, p. 380) , who say "Since the hedonic price schedule reveals the MWTP at a given point, it can be used to infer the welfare effects of a marginal change in a characteristic for a given individual."
Nevertheless, this feature of the hedonic must be used carefully. A hedonic price does not, after all, indicate how much a given household's MWTP varies with a non-marginal change in S, and the average MWTP refers only the same small increment to S for every household. No imaginable policy moves every household the same small distance away from their current level of S, so this average MWTP is of limited usefulness. Moreover, the average MWTP depends on the sorting equilibrium. This average could differ across samples because the distribution of the amenity differs or because the distribution of household characteristics differs, even if household demand functions are identical in every sample. Chay and Greenstone are undoubtedly correct when they say (2005, p. 381) that "inconsistent estimation of the hedonic price schedule will lead to an inconsistent MWTP function, invalidating any welfare analysis of nonmarginal changes regardless of the method used to recover preference or technology parameters." It is equally true, however, that Chay and Greenstone are incorrect when they compare their average MWTP estimates to those of other studies without recognizing the potential impact of variation in the distribution of the amenity or in household traits across the samples used in various studies. This problem arises even if the hedonic is linear. As discussed earlier, it is possible to derive a linear hedonic with extreme assumptions, but a linear hedonic cannot be derived from linear bid functions. Thus, the slope of a linear hedonic only indicates MWTP for small increments in the amenity and does not indicate the willingness to pay for meaningful policy changes.
Moreover, even this interpretation does not apply when the hedonic is mis-specified. For the reasons given earlier, a hedonic estimated with a single S term likely provides a biased estimate of individual MWTP and hence a biased estimate of mean MWTP. Consider the hedonic in equation (13) 
The λ terms are defined after equation (13). A linear hedonic does not yield the average of this expression over households.
An example is provided in Figure 4 , which plots a hedonic based on equation (13) Consider equation (14), which indicates the MWTP for a single household. Except under extreme assumptions (namely, -μ = σ3 = ∞ = the same linear bid function for everyone and no sorting), the derivative of (14) with respect to time depends on the time derivative of S. A change in S leads to movement along the demand curve for S and hence to a change in MWTP. It makes no sense to define ΔS as the key explanatory variable while at the same time assuming that its coefficient, which is a function of ΔS, does not change. Furthermore, unless the sorting equilibrium does not change, the time derivative of equation (24) is also affected by changes in the σ parameters, which describe the equilibrium sorting pattern. Note that the problem here is not one of controls; it arises even with double-sales data and house-level fixed effects.
The role of sorting in a change form of the hedonic has been recognized for a long time.
See, for example, Bartik (1988) . It is also recognized in some empirical studies with a discrete change in S, such as the studies of school district grades by Figlio and Lucas (2004) These interpretation problems go beyond non-marginal changes and re-sorting, however.
Any estimate of average MWTP is associated with a specific sorting equilibrium. Anything that changes this equilibrium may alter the estimated average MWTP, even if it is not associated with a change in an amenity. Extensive immigration into an urban area, for example, may alter the distribution of household bid functions and hence the average MWTP-an effect that cannot be untangled from the effects of changes in the amenity and re-sorting of the initial households.
Paradoxically, one example of misinterpreting results from a change form of the hedonic appears in Chay and Greenstone (2005) , who also carefully describe the limits of the average the amenity coefficient, β, varies across households. Then they estimate a change form of this hedonic in which the average value of β "is stationary over time" (p. 393). Using our notation:
This specification is contradictory; the average MWTP is a function of the distribution of air quality, so changes in air quality over time, which appear in their data, alter the average MWTP.
Moreover, their formulation rules out changes in the distribution of MWTP caused, for example, by changes in the distribution of income or re-sorting based on changes in the distribution of air quality across counties. These possibilities are at the heart of the underlying theory and cannot be adequately addressed with an assumption that the key coefficient is "stationary."
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The same hidden assumptions appear in Bajari at al. (2012) . They "constrain the marginal effect of pollution on price to be constant over time " (p. 1916) . Their claim is that this approach "assists with model identification," but more to the point, it is inconsistent with the changes in air quality over time, as documented in their figure 2, and with the possibility of re-sorting.
Border Fixed Effects or Neighborhood Fixed Effects in a Panel
Another interpretation issue comes from border fixed effects (BFEs). These fixed effects were made popular by Black (1999) and, as reviewed in Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger (2011), have been widely used since then. This approach begins by dividing elementary school attendance zone boundaries into segments. The distance from the nearest boundary is then recorded for each house sale in the sample. A fixed effect for each segment is then set equal to unity for all the houses within a given distance of that segment (and for which that is the closest segment). In a regression of house values on elementary school quality, these fixed effects control for unobserved neighborhood effects shared by houses on either side of a boundary segment.
Because houses on either side of a segment face the same average school quality at the district level, the use of BFEs alters the meaning of the regression coefficients for school quality.
These coefficients do not capture the impact of school quality generally on housing prices, but instead capture the impact of variation in elementary school quality within a district. The impact of relative elementary school quality and of overall school quality in a district may not be the same. 21 Households may care little about relative elementary school quality when they know that all students in the district will go to the same middle school and/or the same high school.
Alternatively, parents may be eager for their children to get off to a fast start; if so, the withindistrict elasticity might be higher than the across-district elasticity.
21 Dhar and Ross (2012) define BFEs along school district boundaries; Fack and Grenet (2010) point out that BFE's with long boundaries along dissimilar neighborhoods may not help much.
Of course, estimating the impact of within-district variation in elementary school quality on housing prices is a perfectly reasonable thing to do, but this impact is different from the impact of school district quality on housing prices. Adding BFEs is not a correction for omitted variable bias in estimating the impact of school district quality on housing prices, it is a method that changes the meaning of the regression-while correcting for a certain type of omitted variable bias in this re-defined regression. 22 The problem is that people using border fixed effects do not recognize this change in interpretation. Black (1999, p. 590) , for example, finds that her estimate with BFEs "is roughly half the estimated effect if one runs a simple hedonic regression… This finding suggests that, if one does not carefully control for neighborhood characteristics, one will greatly overestimate the value of the additional school quality as measured by test scores." This conclusion is not correct. The simple hedonic regression estimates the average impact of difference in school quality both across and with districts, whereas the regression with BFEs only reflects differences in school quality within a district.
Other studies also fail to recognize the impact of BFEs on interpretation. Kane et al. (2006, p. 197) say that "With no fixed effects included for boundary or neighborhood…., we estimate a one student-level SD difference in school test scores is associated with a 0.527 log point increase in housing values. Controlling for 84 boundary fixed effects cuts this estimate nearly in half." Bayer et al. (2007, p. 604-5) conclude that the estimated effect of a one-standard deviation increase in a school's average test score on the cost of housing declines by nearly 75 percent, from $124 to $33 per month, when boundary fixed effects are included in the analysis. This suggests…that the majority of the observed correlation between test scores and housing prices is driven by the correlation of school quality with other aspects of housing or neighborhood quality.
These statements are also not correct.
In sum, there is nothing wrong with a regression that includes BFEs. The question this regression addresses, namely, the impact of within-district variation in school quality on house values, is worth studying. But it is a different question than the one these studies claim to address. The ability of BFEs to control for unobserved neighborhood traits does not prevent the change in interpretation that is caused by their inclusion. Leaving out BFEs may result in omitted variable bias, but including them inevitably changes the meaning of the regression. Thus, the correct interpretation of the results in these studies is that the estimated impact of within-district variation in elementary test scores on house values is considerably smaller than the (possibly biased) estimates of the full variation, across-district and within-district, in test scores.
Similar problems of interpretation arise with neighborhood fixed effects in a panel of house sales not limited to double sales. As explained earlier, a model with neighborhood fixed effects is determining the impact on housing prices of deviations in observable variables from their across-time neighborhood mean. People buying housing may respond differently to the across-time mean value of school quality in a neighborhood than to variation in school quality around this mean. For example, some neighborhoods may have a reputation for excellent schools that is little affected by year-to-year variation in a test-score quality measure. On the basis of their results with tract fixed effects, Clapp, Nanda, and Ross (2008, p. 464) claim that "crosssectional studies that do not control for unobservable components of neighborhood quality overstate the influence of test scores on property values." In fact, all they have shown is that in their data deviations from over-time tract mean school quality have a smaller estimated impact on property values than their (possibly biased) estimates based on all school-quality variation.
IV. Conclusions
The studies reviewed in this paper all make contributions, some of which are important, to the hedonics literature. Bayer et al. (2007) (Table 6 ) and make their approaches unsuitable for use in benefit-cost analysis, at least not without major revisions.
The research flaws identified in this paper using basic hedonic theory concern issues of functional form, control variables, and interpretation. Our hope is that future research using the hedonic method will build on the strengths of recent studies without any of these hedonic "vices." Scholars should select functional forms for hedonic regressions that do not rule out sorting and that are consistent with second-step demand estimations; they should recognize that regressions including demand variables as controls are bid-function regressions, not hedonics, and need to include interaction terms and address endogeneity; and they should interpret their results carefully, particularly when comparing their results to those of other hedonic studies or when their regressions include border fixed effects or when using double-sales data. Once these steps are taken, the new approaches to hedonics will be able to significantly improve estimates of willingness to pay for use in benefit-cost analysis. 
